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STATEMENT OF
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ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
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Introduction

Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Pacific Command and our area of responsibility (AOR) in the Asia-Pacific. I am pleased to report that 2009 was a very productive year for us and, through your continued support, we anticipate 2010 to be the same. I also would like to thank you for your interest in the AOR. I have either met many of you en route to the region or followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and interest send a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way into the region so my staff and I may brief you on the security environment or on the return trip to share your impressions from your engagements.

Today is my first posture hearing as the Pacific Command Commander. Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region and exercise a few of our contingency plans. Based on that experience, I would hope that we could expand our discussion on the following areas during my testimony:

- The Asia-Pacific region is vital to our nation; it is quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe due to its economic expansion and potential.
- Key to our commitment to the region is our forward-deployed/postured forces.
- We face challenges in building partner capacity under the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our Security Assistant efforts.
- The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. Modernizing and expanding our relationships with our allies and security partners is vital to maintaining stability and enhancing security in the region.

- China's growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and opportunities for the United States and regional countries.
- China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular concern is that elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region.
- India's strategic location, shared democratic values, growing economy and evolution as a regional power combine to make them a partner with whom we need to work much more closely.

For over 60 years U.S. Pacific Command has helped provide a secure environment within the AOR that has allowed the regional countries to focus on developing their economies and building strong government institutions. Today we see the benefits of these efforts as the global economic center of gravity shifts into the region in alignment with our own nation's interests. Consider the following achievements over the past year:

- On a combined basis, the nations in the AOR had an estimated GDP (on an exchange rate basis) of \$15.1 trillion; compared to total U.S. GDP of \$14.3 trillion.
- U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with countries in the AOR totaled nearly \$1.3 trillion.
- In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the world's third largest economy behind the United States and Japan.
- Five of our "Top Ten" trading partners are now Asia-Pacific countries.
- The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world's most strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transiting annually, carrying half of the world's oil and 90% of the oil imported by China, Japan and South Korea – our second, fourth and seventh largest trading partners, respectively. Due to the cooperative efforts of the nations bordering this waterway, piracy has dropped from a high of 38 incidents a year in 2004 to just two in 2009.

In my travels and discussions with leaders in the region both as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, I have found that our continuous regional presence is not only welcomed, but strongly desired. Maintaining such a posture is not a simple task given size and diversity of our AOR. For example, sitting in my headquarters in Honolulu, I am closer to New York City than Sydney, Australia. A soldier at Fort Lewis in Washington State is closer to Kuwait City than he is to Bangkok, Thailand. These vast distances make our forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces all the more important if we desire to remain a highly effective influence in the region. The abilities of the more than 140,000 men and women - who represent our forward-stationed/deployed joint forces - to project credible combat power serves as an effective deterrent to those who would disrupt the Asia-Pacific security environment or threaten our friends and allies. In no other region of the world is the requirement for a properly postured, ready force with dominant high-end capabilities more vital than in the Asia-Pacific. The forward forces are the strongest statement of U.S. commitment to the region and any reduction in their posture, readiness or capability is regarded as waning interest and diminished U.S. influence.

The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have also made it clear that we should not take our level of influence within the region for granted. Many countries, most notably China, see the same strategic opportunities that we do and are seeking to increase their level of access and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific by building and expanding economic, diplomatic and security relationships. While we remain the current "*partner of choice*," leaders consistently tell me it's growing more

difficult to be a U.S. partner given the “constraints,” such as limitations of our security assistance programs that often accompany that partnership.

Among our most powerful programs for the region are the security assistance programs that focus on building partner capacity in security-related areas. These programs expose future leaders of other countries to our values and culture through education and training; present opportunities for nations to purchase U.S. military equipment that enables greater interoperability in our combined operations; and provide engagement opportunities for our best ambassadors, our young servicemen and women, to develop relationships with the region’s military personnel and general populations. Unfortunately these programs have not evolved much since the end of the Cold War. As reported by the QDR, these security assistance programs are constrained by a “patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of time.” I agree with this description and fully support the Administration’s efforts to reform and enhance these important programs as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our competitive edge. I hope you will support the Administration efforts in this regard.

I would like to discuss in detail some of my priorities for the region which include: allies and partners, China, India, North Korea, and transnational threats.

Allies and Partners

Five of our nation’s seven mutual defense treaties are with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to work closely with these regional treaty allies – Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand – to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance security within the region.

Australia. Australia remains a steadfast ally that is firmly committed to enhancing global and regional security and to providing institutional assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is particularly active leading the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to global security are evident by their recently increased force presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan.

Australia highly values advancing interoperability and enhanced defense cooperation with the U.S., particularly through training events and acquisition programs. Last year, TALISMAN SABER 2009, a large scale biennial, bilateral combined arms exercise that focuses on strengthening the U.S.-Australian military-to-military relationship, enjoyed unprecedented participation (of 24,000 U.S. and Australian military personnel). The exercise enhanced interoperability and our collective ability to provide security in the region by focusing heavily on combined command and control, amphibious operations, close combat and combined arms, and joint and coalition logistics. The U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate extensively in many other areas including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR).

Japan. Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S. basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall alliance, remain strong, as evidenced by Prime Minister Hatoyama's recent pledge of support. That being said, we must make every effort – particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance – to remind the citizens of

both the U.S. and Japan of the importance of our alliance to enduring regional security and prosperity.

U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in 2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps. Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include: relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier airwing from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces; and adjusting the burden-sharing arrangement through the relocation of ground forces.

The rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa, will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marines Corps aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the relocation of Marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review by May of this year. The U.S. remains committed to the 2006 DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries.

The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global influence. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral interactions with the U.S., and in some multi-lateral engagements with the U.S. and our other allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to maintain over \$4 billion in annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.–ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General Sharp’s testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the Peninsula, but note that General Sharp’s progress in handling the transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military has been exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea.

The transformation of the U.S.–ROK alliance will ultimately assist the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the evolving trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed in realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address complex contingencies throughout the region make this tri-lateral partnership a goal worth pursuing.

Republic of the Philippines (RP). The RP is simultaneously conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations, and developing a maritime security capability. These efforts in turn support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a stronger Philippine government capable of assuming a greater role in providing for its own regional security.

In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Most significantly, the Philippines is actively working to transition their forces from a focus on internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016.

Lastly, USPACOM continues to support the AFP in their counter-insurgency and counter-terror efforts in the south. 2009 marked some notable AFP successes and we have seen that its momentum has carried over to 2010.

Thailand. Thailand remains a critical Southeast Asian ally and engagement partner. In addition, we appreciate Thailand's important global security contributions to overseas contingency operations, counter-narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations (such as their upcoming deployment to Darfur).

In Thailand, U.S. PACOM forces enjoy unmatched access and support. We recently completed the 29th Exercise COBRA GOLD which we co-host with/and in Thailand. COBRA GOLD remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise which this year had six participants and observers from more than 15 nations.

The U.S. and Thailand share important mutual goals on democracy, regional stability, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation. Thailand is a positive contributor to the regional security environment and I am committed to strengthening and broadening our alliance even further.

Partnerships

Successfully managing the many security challenges in the region depends upon a collaborative approach between like-minded nations who appreciate the fundamental relationship between security and enduring prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command expends significant time and resources developing relationships with non-ally nations who understand the role common cause partnerships play in the establishment of regional security. While these relationships often begin or focus on narrow or specific areas of shared interest, as trust grows and common values are realigned, broader regional security contributions often result. U.S. Pacific Command appreciates that strong bilateral relationships advance in complexity and effectiveness on the basis of individual engagements and according to capacities, capabilities, and a partner-nation's desire and

national interest. That being said, there is regional security benefit provided by all of the partnerships we enjoy among the 36 Asia-Pacific nations.

An example of such a partnership – one that has matured significantly in the past several years and one that contributes in many ways to enhanced regional security – is the one we share with Singapore. Initially a relationship focused on trade, maritime security, and a modest U.S. logistics presence, it has since expanded into other areas. In 2005, the relationship was formalized with the signing of a security agreement which identified Singapore and the U.S. as “Major Security Cooperation Partners.” Today Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in the region, hosting many of our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.

Our rapidly developing relationship with Indonesia – the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world - provides another excellent example of a partnership of great importance to enduring regional security. After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), the significant level of transparency and extent of institutional reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono has provided impetus to renew and advance our military relationship. Based on a desire to contribute more to the regional security effort, the TNI now plays a larger leading role in multilateral events and exercises that focus on capabilities such as HA/DR and peace keeping. We are looking forward to supporting Indonesia’s developing security role in the region, particularly as the Administration builds towards a new “comprehensive partnership”.

China.

One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion about the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's national strategy remains primarily focused on economic development which emphasizes domestic stability and maintaining an international security environment conducive to continued economic growth. This new found economic wealth is funding a military modernization program that has raised concerns in the region over the lack of transparency into Beijing's emerging military capabilities and the intentions that motivate them – a concern shared by the United States. China's interest in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country's developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners. Reconciling the apparent gap between the PRC's statements and its observed military capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue with China's armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues. However, that type of frank and candid discussion requires a stable and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relationship– a relationship that does not yet exist with the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA).

People's Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization. China has continued a rapid, comprehensive program of military modernization with supporting doctrine and a professionalization of the officer and enlisted ranks. This program of modernization has been supported by a military budget that has grown annually by double digits over the last decade. Beijing publicly asserts that China's military modernization is “purely defensive

in nature,” and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial concerns, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving doctrine and capabilities.

The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining a professional cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers. Incentives include advanced training and education, as well as housing and post-service employment preferences that should lead to a more motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a broader range of combined arms missions.

China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is continuing to develop a “Blue Water” capability that includes the ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended distances from the PRC mainland. Modernization programs have included development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well as supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles.

China’s leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet *KUZNETSOV* class aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.

China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force in the world totaling more than 60 boats; while the quality of China’s submarine fleet is mixed the

percentage of modern, quiet submarines in the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of nuclear powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. China is also developing a new submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the JL-2, capable of ranging the western United States.

China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter aircraft, including the SU-27 and SU-30 purchased from Russia and indigenously produced 4th generation aircraft. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval air forces have continued to focus on improving pilot and controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios, including operations over water. The PLA has focused considerable effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 long range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.

Until recently, “jointness” in the PLA meant that different services operated toward a common goal in a joint or combined campaign with operations separated by time and distance. However, years of observing U.S. military operations and modern warfare campaigns have convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level. The PLA has adopted the concept of “Integrated Joint Operations” as a goal for the Chinese military to allow it to conduct integrated operations on a campaign level. Additionally, the PLA has placed increased emphasis on training in more demanding conditions, such as complex electromagnetic environments.

China's Strategic Capabilities. China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of the world, including the continental United States. This capability has been enhanced through the development of increasingly sophisticated road mobile delivery systems as well as the development of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class SSBN). Despite assertions that China opposes the “weaponization” of space, the PLA is developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries the use of space, an element of which was demonstrated in January 2007 when China intentionally destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon.

U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated from within the PRC. Although most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data, the skills being demonstrated would also apply to network attacks.

China's Ongoing “Sovereignty” Campaigns. Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA's continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-Strait military balance in Beijing's favor. The Taiwan Relations Act provides that it is U.S. policy "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." At the U.S. Pacific Command, we fulfill these obligations on a daily basis.

Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and consolidation of self-proclaimed sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-asserted its claims to most of the South

China Sea and reinforced its position in the region, including the contested Spratly and Paracel Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the region and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the contested island chains. Additionally, China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests areas on its border with India.

As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted certain international laws in ways contrary to international norms, such as the UN Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has passed domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.

U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation. U.S. Pacific Command is committed to the development of a stable and reliable military-to-military relationship with the PRC, which is critical to avoiding misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately, building the type of partnership that leaders in both countries aspire to. Although we are currently in a period of reduced engagement activity due to the PRC's reaction to the notification of arms sales to Taiwan, last year's military-to-military activities were highlighted by exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to further develop the military aspect of the U.S. – People's Republic of China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command looks forward to working with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to strengthen our military relationship in order to improve the security interests of both the United States and China. These measures include senior leader visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise observer exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical exchange. The PLA leadership has also shown a

willingness to expand military engagement to areas such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, maritime safety, and non-proliferation.

As the Executive Agent for the U.S. – PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior leader bilateral MMCA discussions last summer in Beijing. The MMCA forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve safety for airmen and sailors when our nations' vessels and aircraft operate in proximity to one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy Coordination Talks held in Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate the MMCA as a viable diplomatic mechanism through which we can manage issues related to maritime and air safety.

India

The complexity, unique significance, and growing importance of the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership warrant considering this nation apart from the broader Allies and Partners focus previously discussed. Our nation's partnership with India is especially important to long term South and Central Asia regional security and to U.S. national interests in this vital sub-region. India's leadership as the largest democracy, its rising economic power, and its influence across South Asia as well as its global influence attest to its pivotal role in shaping the regional security environment. We must continue to strengthen this relationship and, while our near-term challenges in Central Command are of great strategic importance, we must ensure the U.S.-India relationship remains rooted in our extensive common interests of which the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is only one. U.S. Pacific Command is working hard to develop bonds that are trust-based, leverage our shared values, and endure beyond current conflicts. Such an approach is critical to taking

advantage of the full potential of our relationship; and to effectively collaborating on the wide range opportunities available in an area of the world that is not only home to some of the most contentious geo-political and transnational challenges, but also to some of the most vital sea, air, and land lines of communication.

Our relationship has grown significantly over the past five years as both countries work to overcome apprehensions formed during the Cold War era, particularly with respect to defense cooperation. Resolution of the long-standing End User Monitoring (EUM) issue removed a major obstacle to a more robust and sophisticated defense sales program. To date, for example, the Government of India has purchased Lockheed Martin C-130Js and Boeing P-8I aircraft; expressed their interest to acquire C-17s; and conducted flight tests of F-16s and F/A-18s (under consideration in the medium multi-mission role combat aircraft competition). The recent increase in defense sales, which exceeded \$2 billion in 2009, not only enhances U.S. access to one of the largest defense markets in the world, but more importantly enables greater cooperation between our armed forces.

The complexity of our exercises and training events is increasing and we are expanding our cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. We currently engage together combating piracy in Gulf of Aden, countering terrorism, enhancing maritime security, expanding POW/MIA recovery missions, and conducting HA/DR events. One of our most notable accomplishments was last year's bi-lateral Exercise YUDH ABHYAS. Located in India, it included the largest deployment of U.S. Stryker vehicles outside of the Middle East. Such events offer unique training opportunities, allow for increased personal and professional interaction and relationship building, and improve our ability to work together across a sophisticated range of operations.

We continue to search for new areas to cooperate as our relationship develops. One area that has been prominently mentioned in the QDR is managing the global commons. Threats in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains will be of increasing concern to both our nations; and we see many opportunities for U.S.-India cooperation to address broad threats to the region's and the world's common areas.

As our relationship develops, U.S. Pacific Command remains mindful of the significance of India-Pakistan tensions, particularly as they relate to the broader security discussion and the management of geo-political challenges that span Combatant Commands (Pakistan resides within Central Command's AOR and India resides in the Pacific AOR). We are keenly aware of the importance of a peaceful co-existence between these two nuclear-armed nations and stand ready to assist with this goal in conjunction with interagency partners.

North Korea

As President Obama has said, "the path for North Korea to realize its future is clear: a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding previous commitments, including a return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." We remain convinced that our strong bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, as well as our growing trilateral cooperation, are critical to deterring the DPRK and to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue to work with our interagency partners to ensure military involvement in relevant areas such as PSI, operations to enforce UNSC resolutions, and multilateral non-proliferation exercises are synchronized with diplomatic approaches and that they contribute to the transmission of a clear and consistent message to the DPRK.

Transnational Threats

Counter Terrorism: U.S. Pacific Command has long employed a strategy of working "by, with and through" regional partners to combat terrorism in the region. Our main effort, the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), operates in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region. The work of U.S. forces - advising, training, exercising, and informing - in conjunction with the resolute commitment and impressive abilities of AFP personnel, has resulted in great success. Over the past year the AFP has captured or killed more than a dozen Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leaders. Perhaps more importantly, the effort has resulted in enhanced quality of life and denial of safe haven to extremists in the area.

Leveraging the lessons learned in Southeast Asia, and in concert with our interagency and regional partners, we are developing plans to combat extremism in South Asia. Our efforts there will undoubtedly require a whole-of-government approach and a coordinated multi-national effort given the extent of the problem and the variety of regional CT organizations, responsibilities, authorities, and policies.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Our main effort to counter the spread of WMD is through support for the State Department's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Fifteen nations in the AOR have endorsed the PSI. Of particular note is the success by Thailand to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 last December when they intercepted 35 tons of illicit weaponry that had originated from North Korea.

In October 2009, Singapore hosted the 38th PSI Exercise, DEEP SABRE II, in which U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel participated – with the armed forces of 18

other nations - in maritime interdiction exercises designed to enhance the capabilities and improve the coordination of participating nations. We are looking forward to supporting future regional PSI Exercises. Additionally, and in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we conducted Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense and Consequence Management bilateral working groups with Japan and the Republic of Korea with the intent of improving interoperability and growing regional capability and capacity.

Northeast Asia

Mongolia. A strong partner, Mongolia continues to demonstrate support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives, while managing positive relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia. The Mongolia Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with their transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions. In support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which serves as the Executive Agent for MDR, U.S. Pacific Command implements bilaterally agreed-to initiatives and priorities further the defense relationship between the U.S. and Mongolia.

Members of the Mongolia Armed Forces regularly participate in bilateral and multilateral for a such as the Pacific Army Management Seminar, Pacific Rim Air Chiefs Conference, Chief of Defense Conference, and NCO subject matter expert exchanges.

Mongolia continues to support peacekeeping and coalition operations and, with assistance from the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), continues to develop the Five Hills Training Center into a national, and eventually, a regional peacekeeping training center which hosts UN-certified training and component-level peacekeeping exercises for

regional participants. Every year, the Mongolian Armed Forces partner with either U.S. Army Pacific or U.S. Marine Forces Pacific to host KHAAN QUEST. Following two years as the GPOI capstone peacekeeping exercise in 2006 and 2007, KHAAN QUEST remains an important multi-lateral peacekeeping exercise.

Finally, I would like to add that Mongolia committed to deploying 800 personnel to Chad in late-2009 in support of the UN, while continuing to support the UN in Sierra Leone and other UN missions in Africa. A strong supporter in U.S. overseas contingency operations, in the fall of 2009, Mongolia deployed 200 troops in Afghanistan, with a security company and a mobile training team under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and a 40 soldier security detachment under the Germans as part of the International Security Assistance Force.

Russia. U.S. Pacific Command coordinates all Russian security cooperation activities with U.S. European Command to ensure the efforts of both geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. We seek engagement with Russia in areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations. U.S. Pacific Command contacts were re-established in 2009 when the USS COWPENS and USS STETHEM conducted port visits to Vladivostok. These port visits were symbolic of the historic and positive relationship that has existed in recent years between U.S. Pacific Command and Russia's Far East Command, particularly between our two navies. We plan to build on the success of these port visits by continuing to engage Russia in areas of mutual interest in accordance with the Military Cooperation Work Plan.

Southeast Asia

Malaysia. Our military-to-military ties with Malaysia remain solid amidst a warming bilateral political relationship and enhanced ties between the U.S. and ASEAN nations. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command developed closer ties to the Malaysian Joint Forces Command by participating in major command post exercises and by supporting their forces to enhance their capacity in maritime security operations. Malaysia maintains a strong leadership role in the region by being tough on terrorism, serious about maritime security, and committed to global peace and stability. We will continue to expand our cooperation with Malaysia and address our common security challenges.

Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the region. The Cambodia Ministry of National Defense and Royal Cambodian Armed Forces are seeking U.S. engagement opportunities. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command supported Cambodia's major initiatives of counter-terrorism, maritime security, defense reform, HA/DR, and peacekeeping operations. In 2010, we will continue to assist Cambodia on its Defense Reform initiative; augment its counter-terrorism efforts with 1206 funding; and, together with Australia and Japan, work with their defense establishment and interagency to achieve their maritime security goals.

Laos. With the U.S. Defense Attaché now in place, U.S.–Laos military-to-military engagement is expanding. The Joint Task Force Full Accounting recovery mission, led by the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), continues to be an important focus in developing U.S.–Laos military relations. Laos has placed a priority on English language training to enable greater training opportunities and participation in bilateral or multilateral operations. In our bilateral defense discussions with the Ministry of National Defense, both sides agreed to explore greater engagement opportunities

associated with military medical cooperation, civil military operations, training and education, and counter-narcotics cooperation.

Vietnam. As we prepare to mark the 15th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations, our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam continues to improve. Vietnam hosted several ship visits this year including the Seventh Fleet Flag Ship, the USS BLUE RIDGE, and its escort, the USS LASSEN, whose commanding officer was born in Vietnam. In support of JPAC, USNS BRUCE HEEZEN, with embarked Vietnamese scientists and personnel, conducted the first combined hydrographic survey in Vietnamese waters, successfully identifying potential crash sites. During his visit to Pacific Command last December, Vietnam's Minister of Defense indicated a desire for activities that foster greater understanding and cooperation in various areas such as disaster management, conflict resolution, trafficking in persons, and improving relations with its neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam's chairmanship of ASEAN this year and its desire to take a more responsible role in promoting peace and security in the region.

Timor-Leste. U.S. Pacific Command remains optimistic about the future of this young democracy. The government of Timor-Leste managed to maintain control of the country and return home more than 10 percent of its population who were living in IDP camps. Timor-Leste is working with several other countries to begin critical institutional development which includes the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL). Although its soldiers lack many basic capabilities, the F-FDTL leadership is developing a recruiting and training program to establish a legitimate, professional military.

U.S. Pacific Command's interaction with Timor-Leste increased significantly in 2009, highlighted by our first military-to-military bilateral discussions. The F-FDTL

participated in the Marine Exercise MAREX 09, a multilateral exercise with Timorese and Australian Defense Forces that concentrated on basic infantry skills and medical and dental readiness. Although current engagement with Timor-Leste is mostly in the form of medical and dental readiness exercises and engineer assistance by U.S. Navy SEABEES, we are hopeful that engagements such as MAREX 09 will form the basis of our relationship as the F-FDTL develops into a professional military.

Burma. Beyond the significant issues associated with their human rights record, Burma presents challenges to regional stability in a number of other areas, including a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh, narcotics trafficking, trafficking-in-persons, and potential for rapid spread of pandemic disease. The recently completed U.S. government policy review and subsequent high level visits to Burma by senior-level members of the U.S. Government have not altered our military engagement with Burma. It remains essentially non-existent as a matter of policy and public law. That said, U.S. Pacific Command is prepared to re-engage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Burmese whenever U.S. policy allows.

South Asia

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The conclusion of the Government of Sri Lanka's war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist group in May 2009 brought about an uneasy peace to Sri Lanka. Concerns over the welfare of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) initially caused the international community to pressure the Government of Sri Lanka to better provide for the IDPs while expediting the return to their homes. To its credit, the Government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to lower the number of IDPs in camps to a current estimate of around 100,000.

As a consequence of allegations of human rights violations, all U.S. military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka was halted in August 2009, with the exception of humanitarian assistance. In the meantime, we await development of a USG strategy that may include enhanced mil-to-mil.

Republic of Maldives. Since President Nasheed took office in November 2008, we have seen a marked increase with Maldives' desire to interact with U.S. Pacific Command. Maldives strategic location astride key shipping lanes in addition to its archipelagic geography make it a key region for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Maldives requested U.S. assistance in helping the Maldives National Defense Force transform itself into a force more capable of defending against the threats of terrorism, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking. In response to the Government of Maldives' concerns that international terrorist organizations were actively recruiting Maldivian citizens, we provided assistance in development of a national intelligence capability enabling quicker responses across various agencies of their government.

Nepal. The resignation by the Maoist government in May 2009 resulted in a political stalemate that continues to cast serious doubts as to whether Nepal's Constituent Assembly can ratify a constitution by the May 2010 deadline. The Maoists, who still control a plurality of seats in the Assembly, have staged numerous walkouts and demonstrations, effectively impeding the Constituent Assembly and the constitution drafting process.

Due to the potential for the current peace to unravel, U.S. Pacific Command's focus is on humanitarian assistance and efforts to support the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation Army into the Nepalese security forces. Senior level

dialogue and defense sector reform events are the primary means to assist this change. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command continues to assist Nepal in the development of its peacekeeping operations and training capabilities through GPOI. While PACOM is focused on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping activities, we are also noting an increase in violence in the southern Terai region. These poorly governed areas are susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups in South Asia. PACOM will continue to closely monitor this issue and stands ready to assist Nepal in building its CT capacity.

People's Republic of Bangladesh. The return to democracy in Bangladesh, while a positive step, has also resulted in occasional civilian-military tension that could potentially destabilize this moderate nation of 150 million people. U.S. Pacific Command has initiated several programs and events to assist in promoting civilian-military trust, transparency and cooperation.

Despite their political issues, Bangladesh continues to be a strong partner who works closely with the U.S. to enhance regional security. The establishment of a naval counter-terrorism force and their hosting of a regional forum to counter violent extremist organizations are examples of Bangladesh's commitment to improve their counter-terrorism capacity. We also continue to work closely with Bangladesh to expand and improve their peacekeeping, HA/DR and maritime security capabilities.

Oceania

New Zealand. New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns such as terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand is supportive of our overseas contingency operations, deployed for the fourth round its Special Air Service (SAS) special operations troops to Afghanistan

and has extended their commitment to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan until September 2010.

While the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation and resultant U.S. defense policy guidelines constrain some bilateral military-to-military engagement, the New Zealand Defense Force participates in many multilateral events that advance our common security interests. In 2010, New Zealand will be an observer in “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) – the Pacific AOR premier multinational naval exercise. Our Marines continue to assist in New Zealand’s efforts to integrate their multi-role maritime patrol vessel into regional HA/DR operations.

New Zealand remains active in global security initiatives, from stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports our National Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary staging area for the multinational Operation DEEP FREEZE.

Compact Nations. U.S. Pacific Command values our partnership with the three Compact Nations – the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. We meet our defense obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association through implementation of our Homeland Defense planning and preparation. Additionally, we commend the professional Pacific Patrol Boat crews and fully support each nation’s initiatives to expand operations to protect their valuable EEZ resources. We also recognize the significant contributions of the proud citizens of these nations as they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard in Operations such as IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.

Guam. As a U.S. Territory in a strategically important location, Guam is host to a variety of U.S. joint forces, critically important Navy and Air Force installations and the headquarters for Commander U.S. Forces Marianas. Efforts are ongoing to simultaneously prepare for increased Marine Corps presence on Guam, improve Navy and Air Force infrastructure, and improve the quality of life for service members and their families stationed there.

U.S. Pacific Command Organizations

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). While APCSS is not subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command, it is a Department of Defense academic institute that supports U.S. Pacific Command by developing professional and personal ties among national security establishments throughout the region. The Center's focus is on multilateral approaches to security cooperation and capacity-building through its three academic components: executive education, conferences, and research and publications. In FY09, 628 students joined the more than 4,000 fellows from nations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The success of APCSS programs is regularly demonstrated through the courses and seminars that the center offers, and its extensive networking efforts (there are currently 45 alumni associations in as many nations). APCSS builds its programs to address areas of mutual interest and concern held by the U.S. and the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). JPAC has the important mission of achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from our nation's conflicts. Last year, JPAC successfully completed 69 missions globally and, in cooperation with 16 nations on 4 continents, identified 93 Americans missing from the

Vietnam War, Korean War, and World Wars I & II. We expect another successful year in 2010 and are projected to execute 75 missions. Of note, engagement with North Korea remains suspended, but we are prepared to resume discussions and operations as soon as conditions permit.

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). JIATF-West's mission is to conduct activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by providing interagency intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing partner nation capacity. The command was essential to several significant victories this past year that included JIATF-West Tactical Analysis Team support to law enforcement operations which dismantled several transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-West also worked directly with the Drug Enforcement Agency in the multi-ton seizure operation of Asian precursor chemicals destined to methamphetamine laboratories in Mexico and Guatemala.

With respect to capacity building successes in 2009, JIATF-West supported the establishment of Vehicle Control Checkpoint (VCC) facilities in Sikhiu and Chumphon, Thailand. These VCCs were specifically set up to enhance border security and interdiction capacity in a region known for illicit trafficking. Also this year, JIATF-West executed 17 counter-narco-terrorism training missions which trained 1,578 partner nation law enforcement officials from Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam in ground and maritime interdiction skills.

Although JIATF-West's authorities allow us to act against transnational criminal organizations, *inclusion of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines under 1033 authority would allow us to better support U.S. and partner-nation Law Enforcement*

Agencies. This authority would allow JIATF-West to provide tools and training to maintain operational maritime assets, and automated data processing and information technology networking equipment for JIATF West –constructed interagency fusion centers.

Programs

Security Assistance. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), executed in partnership with the Department of State and our embassy country teams, are powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing countries. FMF – the program for financing the acquisition of U.S. military articles, service, and training that support U.S. regional stability goals - continues to demonstrate its worth. It has been particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The IMET program – which provides education and training to students from allied and friendly nations - also continued to provide lasting value to all participants. The program is a modest but highly effective investment that yields the professional and personal relationships that are so important to regional security.

Science and Technology (S&T). The U.S. Pacific Command S&T Advisor actively engages with Service and Defense S&T organizations to identify potential solutions to operational problems that have a critical impact on combat readiness. This advisor is also responsible for executing the S&T Strategy in support of the lines of operation in our Theater Campaign Plan. That strategy focuses on improving partnership opportunities throughout the AOR and encourages cooperative S&T efforts through the extensive use of OSD’s Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) and Coalition

Warfare Program (CWP).

Pacific Partnership. One of the U.S. Navy's newest cargo ships, USNS RICHARD E. BYRD (T-AKE 4), successfully deployed to Oceania on a five-country, three-month humanitarian and civic assistance mission from June to September 2009. The mission travelled, for the first time to Samoa, Tonga, and Kiribati and returned for a second visit to Solomon Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This annual deployment is designed to build partner capacity and multilateral capability in medical, dental, veterinary and engineering disciplines to enhance regional security and better prepare participating organizations to respond to regional crises. It is a remarkable multinational and multi-organizational evolution that, this year, involved personnel from 14 nations and countless international and host-nation Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In all, the mission treated more than 22,000 medical and dental patients, conducted 116 community relations projects, and completed 17 engineering and infrastructure projects. This summer Pacific Partnership will return to the region aboard USNS MERCY, the Navy's West Coast hospital ship, to deliver help and hope to the people of Indonesia, Timor Leste, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Pacific Angel. Pacific Angel employs the exceptional capabilities of the Pacific Air Forces International Health Services to conduct humanitarian assistance and public diplomacy in less accessible areas of South East Asia. This unique C-17, C-130, and KC-135-based operation is designed to increase public health capacity as well as cooperation and understanding among the armed forces, NGOs, regional partners, and peoples of Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and the United States. Assisted by partner-nation and NGO medical personnel, PACIFIC ANGEL conducted six Medical Civic Action

programs, cared for 14,978 medical and 1,010 dental patients, and completed six engineering civic-actions projects.

NDAA Section 1206. Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region. Last year U.S. Pacific Command contributed more than \$31 million to the maritime security capabilities of Bangladesh and the Philippines. In FY10, we intend to build upon the initiatives funded in 2009 and to expand counter-terrorism capability/capacity in South and Southeast Asia. Given the success of these efforts to date, we very much support the President's request.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA). In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days. OHDACA funds enable Pacific Command forces to respond quickly to those in need when these inevitable disasters occur. Additionally, OHDACA-supported activities promote interoperability and coalition-building with foreign military and civilian counterparts, and improve basic living conditions for populations in countries and regions that are particularly susceptible to violent extremism. OHDACA projects offer a significant and sometimes unique opportunity in the region; and have been particularly helpful to decreasing the operating space of terrorists and violent extremists. OHDACA is a critical element in PACOM's comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI is rooted in a G-8 commitment to addresses major gaps in peace operations around the world. The global initiative aims to build and maintain the capability, capacity, effectiveness of professional

peacekeeping forces. Within the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command's GPOI program leverages existing host-nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises. We encourage long-term sustainment of qualified forces through a "train-the-trainer" approach, which enables standardization and interoperability, and works within the framework of United Nations guidelines. The GPOI program has been fully implemented by U.S. Pacific Command in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Thailand, and Tonga; and this year we will begin implementation in the Philippines. Also in 2010, U.S. Pacific Command will co-host with Cambodia the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect participation in this exercise, Angkor Sentinel, more than 20 of our regional GPOI partners.

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT). The MPAT program is a cooperative, multi-national effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment of a multinational headquarters in response to an HA/DR event in the Asia-Pacific region. The vision of the program is to develop a cadre of multinational military planners from regional nations. The MPAT effort – which currently involves more than 30 nations – works to provide coalition and combined expertise in crisis action planning and seeks to develop procedures that promote multinational partnerships and cooperation in response to military operations other than war and small scale contingencies. Recent MPAT events have focused on building capacity for response to humanitarian crises and on developing standardized operating procedures.

Challenges

Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS). The ability to exchange information among DoD Components, all levels of U.S. Government, coalition partners, and the private sector is becoming increasingly important to regional operations; and increasingly dependent on MNIS efforts such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Informational Exchange (CENTRIX) Cross Enclave Requirement Program and the Improved Connectivity Initiative.

Joint Information Environment (JIE). Within DoD, Services IT architectures are often redundant or incompatible. In an attempt to address this issue, U.S. Pacific Command is partnering with the DoD Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff, all Services, and Industry to develop a JIE that moves to a unified and integrated net-centric environment. When realized, this environment will eliminate the need for Joint Force Commanders to integrate networks; further, it will enable personnel access to the information with a single log-on from anywhere on a DoD network.

Cyberspace. U.S. Pacific Command faces increasingly active and sophisticated threats to our information and computer infrastructure. These threats challenge our ability to operate freely in the cyber commons, which in turn challenges our ability to conduct operations during peacetime and in times of crisis. U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with the newly established U.S. Cyber Command and other Service and Agencies, is working on solutions to detecting these attacks on our networks and to responding to them in near real-time.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Given the size and nature of the Asia-Pacific region, effective ISR is essential to obtaining critical insights into the

plans, capabilities, and intent of our current and potential adversaries. We continue to work with the National Intelligence Community, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Joint Staff to effectively address our intelligence collection priorities, capability gaps, deployments of assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information to maximize situational awareness and warning.

Missile Defense. To defend U.S. forces, interests, allies and friends from short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles, U.S. Pacific Command seeks a forward-deployed, layered, and integrated air and missile defense system capable of intercepting threat missiles throughout their entire time of flight. Additionally, we are coordinating with the Government of Japan to leverage the newest Japanese systems – such as PATRIOT PAC-3, AEGIS SM-3 capable ships and their associated radars.

Piracy. The U.S. Pacific Command continues to facilitate multilateral efforts to improve regional and global maritime security, especially in the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic regions of South East Asia, and in the Gulf of Aden. In Southeast Asia, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) exercise, which is designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination (participants included Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Indonesia participated this past year as an observer). Also of note is the cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and most recently, Thailand, to patrol the Malacca Straits, an effort which has contributed significantly to reduced incidents of piracy in that vital choke point. Lastly, in the tri-border area where Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia share common maritime boundaries, terrorist

freedom of action has been curtailed as a consequence of improved maritime surveillance and response capabilities procured using 1206 authorities.

Pandemic Influenza (PI). U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust pandemic influenza response plan that supports force health protection, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Advise and Assess (AA) teams are available to provide assistance and to coordinate additional support for U.S. States and Territories. Additionally, we are postured to deploy teams to advise U.S. Country Teams and partner nations on PI response and to assess infectious disease control and surveillance programs, laboratories and response team capabilities.

This past year, we conducted more than a dozen PI-related events that included bi- and multi-lateral exercises and subject matter exchanges within our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Highlights from the past year include the Joint Task Force – Homeland Defense exercise LIGHTNING RESCUE 2009, which tested the State of Hawaii’s PI response and validated domestic relationships and linkages to the U.S. Pacific Command PI plan.

Closing

U.S. Pacific Command must be recognized as both an extension of U.S. military power as well as a committed and trusted partner in the Asia-Pacific. Our every endeavor must promote a region whose nations are secure and prosperous. Throughout the AOR, we are fortunate to have allies, partners and friends who willingly and effectively contribute to regional security and who seek to advance their partnerships with the U.S. on behalf of the 36 nations and 3.4 billion people who reside in the Asia-Pacific region.

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to the Committee for the long-standing support you have provided our military. Your efforts have provided our members

with the most technically advanced systems and with a quality of life that recognizes the contributions our young men and women make to our nation every day. On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture in the U.S. Pacific Command.